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Abstract: An important but often neglected factor influencing the changes in power relations 
in Eurasia is the development of center-periphery relations in individual countries. Domestic 
and international politics are never clearly separated, especially in the emerging post-Soviet 
states, which still maintain strong economic, cultural and political links among each other. 
The aim of the paper is to understand how international integration and domestic policy 
(re)centralization influenced each other in the post-Soviet countries. It looks at four possible 
combinations of the development of regionalism and decentralization observed in the CIS 
region over the last two decades and develops a simple framework explaining the differences 
between these case studies. 
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1. Introduction1 
 The emergence of multi-level governance structures and reconfiguration of authority 
of traditional centralized states has been subject to studies in numerous “isles of theorizing” in 
public policy, political science, international relations and economics (Hooghe and Marks, 
2003). What has been however a common feature of a significant bulk of research in the area 
is a separate discussion of multi-level structures beyond the nation-state level (usually labeled 
as “decentralization” or “federalism”) and above the nation-state level (labeled as 
“regionalism” or “regional integration”). Certainly, the literature on multi-level governance 
often considers both international and domestic dimensions as cases for the test of a unified 
framework (which is an approach particularly typical for economics, as it can be seen in Feld 
and Kerber, 2006) and thus developing theoretical explanations for the size and authority of 
jurisdictions at both subnational and supranational levels. However, a less often approached 
avenue of research is to look at “international” and “domestic” multi-level governance as two 
separate processes, which influence each other. This is exactly the perspective accepted by 
this paper. 
 If one attempts to briefly look at experience of multi-level governance structures 
worldwide, one would find a huge variety of combinations of domestic and international re-
configurations of the centralized states. There are cases (like the European Union) where 
internal decentralization within member countries goes hand in hand with the international 
integration and creation of supranational institutions, which, in turn, actively engage in the 
interaction with new subnational units within the “Europe of Regions” framework. However, 
in other parts of the world (like North America, for instance), the emergence of 
multilateralism on the international level has been significantly lagging behind as opposed to 
decentralized organization of the US and Canada. On the other hand, the most successful area 
of cooperation among the members of the Organization of African Unity has always been the 
establishment and support of the consensus regarding unchallengeable character of the current 
international borders, supporting the concentration of power of current incumbents and 
preventing devolutionary processes or secessions. In this paper I look at one particular region 
of the world, where, interestingly enough, different combinations of domestic and 
international multi-level governance can be discovered, and hope to use this variation for the 
comparative analysis. 
                                                            
1
 This is a very preliminary and incomplete version of the paper, which has also been presented at the Second 
East Asian Conference on Slavic Eurasian Studies in Seoul in March 2010. The author highly appreciates the 
comments made by the participants of the conference, especially by Peter Rutland; all mistakes and 
inconsistencies are, however, my own. 
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 The paper looks therefore at decentralization and multilateral cooperation of the 
former Soviet Union (FSU) states: twelve former Soviet republics, which received their 
independence in the 1990s, and did not become members of the European Union. The 
environment of the post-Soviet space, where after the collapse of the Soviet Union different 
combinations of regional integration projects and approaches to decentralization have been 
tested by the new independent states, provides a nice background for an empirical study of the 
co-influence of internal decentralization and international integration, simply because one 
obtains the necessary variation of cases in a relatively similar economic and political 
environment. Indeed, as it will be shown in what follows, in the post-Soviet space one can 
find all four possible combinations of decentralization “within” individual jurisdictions and 
multilateral cooperation “between” these jurisdictions, and therefore, examine both 
substitution and complementarity relations between these processes and their determinants.  
 The paper is organized as follows: the next section surveys the key results of the 
literature, provides the main definitions, and also develops a theoretical framework for 
understanding how regionalism and decentralization can influence each other. The third 
section presents four case studies of this paper, which demonstrate different combinations of 
domestic and international movement towards multi-level governance in the post-Soviet 
world. The fourth section looks attempts to link the outcomes of the post-Soviet case studies 
to the theoretical predictions, and the last section concludes. 
 
2. Literature and theoretical framework 
2.1. Definitions 
 Since the problems of multi-level governance are covered by various disciplines, it is 
also important to clearly specify the definitions used in this paper. In what follows I use the 
notion of “decentralization” specifically to refer to “political decentralization”, which implies 
decision-making autonomy of subnational units (Treisman, 2007). It should be noted, 
however, that this paper does not restrict its attention just to cases of delegation of authorities 
set in the formal legislation; it is equally important to recognize that in several cases the 
border between political and administrative decentralization (Hutchcroft, 2001) is not 
unambiguous: say, if governors appointed by the central government for purely administrative 
purposes manage due to lack of control and weakness of the center to “gain” decision-making 
powers in their regions. In this case one could probably refer to a “de-facto” political 
decentralization, when the constitution is changed implicitly without any changes in its text 
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(Voigt, 1999). In order to describe the emergence of multi-level governance on the 
supranational level I use the words “regionalism” and “regional integration” interchangingly. 
In this case, as opposed to the “subnational” decentralization, the notion of “regionalism” is 
rather restricted and includes just the regional interstate cooperation, specifically resulting in 
the establishment of supranational institutions and treaties, thus does not covering 
“regionalization” emerging from the bottom-up interaction of businesses and individuals 
(Hurrell, 1995).  
 In addition, it is important to mention that the problem of “supranational” regionalism 
and “subnational” decentralization for individual countries can be also considered on the level 
of subnational units in federations: in this case the “supranational” dimension becomes their 
relations with the federal government and voluntarily associations, and the “subnational” 
dimension is the set of relations between regional governments and municipalities. In 
decentralized federations like the US or Switzerland the latter exhibit a huge variability, often 
used in comparative decentralization studies similarly to the differences in decentralization 
across individual countries (cf. Feld et al. 2008 as an example). Certainly, the relations 
between regions and the federal government differ from that between individual countries, 
and as it will be shown in what follows, this difference at least partly explains the differences 
in the empirical evidence observed in this paper. However, for the purposes of this study it is 
sufficient to state that one deals with two bargaining processes determining the formation of 
the multi-level governance on two levels, which can influence each other: and this is exactly 
what one requires in the context of this study. Moreover, the distinction between federal states 
and international alliances is in many cases not entirely straightforward: the most prominent 
example of the complexity is the European Union (Marks et al., 2006), but in fact the absence 
of a sharp distinction has been typical for many regions of the world in the past (Rector, 
2009). 
Hence, although the multi-level governance systems are characterized by a variety of 
factors, including the number and scope of jurisdictions and their members, methods of 
control and coordination, presence of intersecting membership and flexibility, this paper 
reduces this multiplicity of criteria to just one dimension: the allocation of authority between 
the supranational, subnational and national levels and its ability to limit the abilities of each 
player for independent actions. Advanced regionalism is therefore defined as a system where 
important institutional tasks are implemented by a single centralized entity or jointly by the 
key countries, but through a formal binding mechanism, restricting the independent decision 
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making on the national level; advanced decentralization also restricts the decision-making on 
the national level through delegation of authorities to subnational jurisdictions. If regionalism 
and / or decentralization are weak, the decisions on the national level can be made without 
significant restrictions.  
 
2.2. Literature 
 As already mentioned, the problem of interaction of decentralization and regionalism 
has so far received only limited attention in the literature. There are however two related 
fields of research, which can provide certain insights into the matter. The first one to be 
mentioned is a relatively small but still growing literature on the interaction between 
decentralization and global or regional opening up of markets. Like this paper, these studies 
focus on how integration and decentralization influence each other; however, unlike this 
paper, the notion “integration” they refer to is economic opening up and degree of 
interdependence of national economies and not the re-allocation of authorities through 
intergovernmental cooperation, although, of course, reduction of border barriers for trade and 
investment between countries can follow from the advancements of cooperation of 
governments. Starting with Alesina et al. (2000), an important strand of this literature claims 
that through opening up one reduces the benefits of public goods provided by the central 
government and hence supports the process of decentralization (and in fact even facilitates the 
secessionism in large states). Stegarescu (2006) and Baskaran (2009) provide some empirical 
evidence for this interdependence, looking also at the European economic integration, while 
Garrett and Rodden (2003) show that globalization can in fact be associated with fiscal 
centralization because of increasing risks and cross-border shocks. 
 The second literature has a more specific geographical scope and looks particularly on 
the influence of regions on the process of European economic integration. The attention of 
this work is in fact similar to what is discussed in this paper, however, the focus on the EU 
also restricts the attention to one particular combination of “domestic” and “international” 
multi-level governance, when both decentralization and regionalism are strong and seem to 
reinforce each other. Specifically, the European Union is a good (but in many instances 
almost unique) example of how supranational institutions are involved in the policy-making 
directly related to the subnational level (for example, Hooghe and Keating, 1994; Bache, 
1998), how subnational jurisdictions from decentralized federations turn into strongly 
lobbyists on the supranational level (for example, Hooghe and Marks, 1996), and how multi-
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level governance on the international level is strengthened through direct cross-border 
cooperation of regions (for example, Perkmann, 2003). The literature on regional aspects of 
the European integration is extremely large and diversified, as are the interactions between 
subnational, supranational and national governments and non-governmental actors in the EU. 
This paper can be seen as complementary to these studies, first, by focusing its attention on a 
different region with different institutional, social and political-economic environment (for 
example, predominance of non-democracies or underdeveloped market economies), and 
second, by looking at cases when regionalism and decentralization are substitutes rather than 
complementary features. 
 
2.3. Emergence of institutions: efficiency and conflics 
As it has been shown by DiMaggio (1998), the studies of emergence of institutions in 
different areas of social science have applied, broadly speaking, three key approaches to this 
problem: institutions as outcomes of efficiency considerations, institutions as by-products of 
struggle for rents and dominance and institutions as functions of identity and mental models. 
Similar point of view can be attributed to the emergence of multi-level governance structures, 
which can be an outcome of power struggles, efficiency considerations and shared identity. 
For the purpose of this paper we will focus on the first two considerations: in the context of 
the post-Soviet world with often very unstable political entities with a relatively short history 
applying shared identity as factor explaining success or failure of emergence of strong 
subnational players or supranational institutions can be problematic: self-identification of the 
population and the elites of the post-Soviet countries is often not entirely clear, as is their 
perception of regionalism in the former Soviet Union (cf. Filippov, 1995; Ketrman, 2005, or 
Blyakher, 2008) or of their sub-regional identity, which turns into a subject of manipulations 
of regional elites (Gel’man and Popova, 2003). In addition, it is more difficult to demonstrate 
the external validity of factors driven by identity or mentality specifics outside the specific 
“post-Soviet world”. 
However, two remaining explanations also provide two different interpretations for the 
emergence of multi-level governance. From the point of view of the efficiency considerations, 
centralization or decentralization can be attributed to the relational contracting, when the 
delegation of authority to a higher level is welfare-improving, since it is able to internalize 
transactions and reduce the risk of the opportunistic behavior (see Lake, 2009, for various 
applications in different areas of politics). Hence, for example, regionalism can be interpreted 
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as an attempt to restrict opportunistic behavior of the countries of the regions, and centralized 
internal political structure is an attempt to restrict opportunistic behavior of subnational 
jurisdictions within the country. The situation becomes more complex, if one takes into 
account that centralization is simply a mechanism of aggregating individual preferences: 
Alesina and Perotti (1998) show that from this perspective centralization is associated with 
economic gains (from internalizing potential spillovers), but also with political risks (of 
making a collective decision contradicting the preferences of an individual participant). 
Nevertheless, the allocation of authorities in the real world seems to strongly deviate 
from the optimal structure because of power conflicts (Hooghe and Marks, 2009). Conflicts 
for rents, however, allow for two different interpretations for the emergence of institutions. 
On the one hand, institutions can simply be designed by a “winner” reflecting her preferences 
regarding the distribution of assets: in this case the degree of centralization within a country 
simply reflects the strength of a winner, and the restrictive character of the international 
agreements masks the power of the hegemon. On the other hand, of course, institutions 
emerge as Hayekian “unintended consequences” of power struggles, and from this point of 
view be unpredictable for both winners and losers in the conflict (Knight, 1992). Anyway, in 
order to understand the design of institutions from this perspective the key ingredient is to 
look at the relative strengths of the participants and their preferences, which should be 
implemented through a conflict as a zero-sum game.  
For the problem studied in this paper the situation looks more difficult, because there 
are two decisions to be considered: the degree of centralization of authority within the country 
and within the group of countries on the supranational level. Hence, there are two problems of 
spillovers internalization versus political risks (in the efficiency perspective) and two possible 
conflicts for power and rents (from the redistribution perspective). An attractive solution then 
seems to combine two theoretical perspectives, applying them to different levels of 
interaction. Consider first the problem of international regionalism. Emergence of regionalism 
can be related to a power struggle between countries of the region (or, possibly, also between 
countries and supranational institutions if they are strong enough – this distinction will be 
particularly important in what follows). From this perspective domestic centralization can be 
considered an attempt to obtain additional resources for the struggle: domestic and 
international conflicts often are substitutes (Muenster and Staal, 2007). Hence, the domestic 
centralization can be treated as an efficiency problem: obtaining resources through 
internalization of transactions versus possible costs of political risks. However, 
8 
 
symmetrically, the domestic centralization can also be treated as a power contest between the 
central and the regional governments; and from this point of view the emergence of 
regionalism (meaning active intergovernmental cooperation – which, as it will also be 
discussed in what follows, is a viable policy option also to subnational jurisdictions) can be 
treated from the efficiency considerations. Figure 1 represents this logic once again. 
 
 
Figure 1: A simplified framework for the analysis 
 
From this point of view one can immediately see that the degree of domestic centralization 
depends on two parameters: first, the power resources of both central and the regional 
governments, and second, the relation between efficiency gains and political risks in the 
relations between countries. Both of these factors should be considered individually for the 
central and the regional government. In the same way, for the regionalism the degree of 
allocation of authorities on the supranational level (or restrictions on the national decision 
making through intergovernmental arrangements) is depends on, on the one hand, resources 
of participants of the international conflict, and on the other hand, the relation between 
efficiency gains and political risks in the relations between the central government and the 
regions in each of the countries.  
 It should be noted that the analysis so far made three simplified assumptions. First, it 
ignores the variety of other factors influencing the evolution of decentralization and 
regionalism; in fact, in what follows I will ignore all other determinants of the power potential 
of the conflicting parties independent from that depending upon the decision made in the 
“complementary” multi-level governance area (for regionalism – in the area of 
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decentralization and vice versa). Of course, this is highly simplified, but on the other hand, 
can be helpful to focus just on the problem of this paper (and not the whole spectrum of 
determinants of decentralization and integration, which have been studied in the literature). 
The second simplifying assumption is related to the former: it claims that, say, gains in 
efficiency from the domestic centralization are helpful in terms of international bargaining. 
This is once again simplified: domestic centralization could provide some additional power 
resources, but they may be too small to make a difference. However, as I will show in what 
follows, at least in the empirical cases studied in this paper the difference mentioned has been 
present and relevant, as it will be shown in the following section. The final simplification is to 
look at the decentralization or regionalism as pure bargaining between governments, since 
other non-governmental agents may also be strongly involved. However, for the empirical 
case of this paper this focus is appropriate, since one is dealing with societies with strong 
deficits of democracy. This may also be an advantage, since it allows me to isolate just the 
“bargaining” components of the decentralization and the regional integration processes and 
look at their interdependence. 
 
2.4. Vertical and horizontal conflicts 
 While considering the redistribution conflict and the efficiency trade-off parts of the 
story, it is worth noticing that an additional dimension can be important: that is the type of 
authority delegation and of relations between the bargaining partners. From that perspective it 
is possible to distinguish between what I will refer to in what follows “vertical” and 
“horizontal” conflicts and power relations. In case of a “vertical conflict”, it takes place 
between jurisdictions located at different levels: say, federal government or regions, or 
supranational institutions and countries. A “horizontal conflict” takes place between 
jurisdictions of the same level – say, different countries or regions. In a similar way, 
regionalism (or centralization) can take forms of a “vertical” arrangement, when authorities 
are delegated to a jurisdiction located at a higher level, or of a “horizontal” one, when 
authorities are implemented by the strongest jurisdiction at the same level (Hancock (2009) 
refers to this arrangement as “plutocratic” integration). For the “centralization” debate within 
individual countries the dominant dimension is usually is “vertical one”, though there are 
several cases when the degree of decentralization within a federation was determined by the 
conflict between its regions (Argentina) or by domination of particular regions (German 
Empire in the late 19th century). In international relations the dominant dimension is usually 
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the “horizontal” one, although once again the distinction is not entirely clear (as the debate on 
supranationalism versus intergovernmentalism in the EU shows clearly). 
The effects of “vertical” and “horizontal” arrangements are not identical. For the 
efficiency trade-off it is possible that a “horizontal” arrangement can be associated with 
significantly lower political risks for the dominant country, which therefore can be more 
likely to support a more centralized framework. On the other hand, maintaining “horizontal” 
dominance relations is often costly (and, in fact, the costs to be covered by the leader are 
over-proportionally high), as it is shown in the literature on military alliances (Sandler and 
Hartley, 2001).  Vertical and horizontal conflicts partly “react” differently on power 
asymmetry between jurisdictions (Libman, 2009a): for example, in a federation with 
asymmetric regions decentralization is more likely, while in an international alliance, on the 
contrary, dominance of one country can support centralization – exactly because in this case 
the federation dynamics is determined by a “vertical” center-region conflict, and the 
development of an international alliance is a function of a “horizontal” conflict between 
countries. For the purpose of this paper we will treat both “vertical” and “horizontal” 
arrangements within the same framework, for both explaining their causes and evaluating 
their success: however, in each case it can be extremely important to identify the “right” 
shape of conflict to be able to provide a reasonable analysis. 
 
3. Regionalism and decentralization in the post-Soviet space: four cases 
3.1. Weak regionalism, strong decentralization: Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan in the 
1990s 
 As already mentioned, an advantage of the post-Soviet space is that one indeed is able 
to observe different combinations of decentralization and regionalism varying either over time 
for the last twenty years, or over space for different subregions of the post-Soviet world. I will 
start with probably the most “typical” combination, if one looks at the related research 
discussed in the previous section, when weak regionalism across countries is combined with 
strong decentralization within individual countries. This scenario could be observed, if one 
looks at three largest post-Soviet countries – Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan – during the 
first decade of their independence from 1991 to approximately 2000. In this case, however, 
one has to take into account the difference between the formal institutional arrangements of 
the post-Soviet countries and the informal structure of authority in the post-Soviet world. 
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 The emergence of the post-Soviet regionalism can be traced back to the collapse of the 
Soviet Union: in fact, the signing of the first “regionalism” agreement establishing the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was indeed the act signifying the dissolution of 
the USSR. During the period of 1990s the CIS, which soon expanded to a regional grouping 
encompassing twelve of fifteen former Soviet republics (with the exception of Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia, which moved to the track towards the EU membership), remained a 
platform for active intergovernmental negotiations. The member countries signed a number of 
agreements (partly contradicting each other), suggesting the need for developed 
intergovernmental cooperation in economic, social and cultural sphere, but also in the area of 
military and security affairs. However, in spite of this immense activity, the CIS treaties 
remained simple “ink on paper” integration: almost none of the CIS agreements was put into 
practice, and the post-Soviet countries easily ignored their obligations made within the CIS 
framework (cf. Malfliet et al., 2007, Kubicek, 2009). It is thus not surprising that almost all 
countries of the CIS occasionally resolved to protectionist measures in foreign trade, directly 
contradicting the CIS agreements (cf. Blejer and del Castillo, 1999). The supranational 
bureaucracy of the CIS, although significant in number, remained very weak and in fact 
served as an area of “exile” of unsuccessful Russian politicians. Attempts to replace the CIS 
by alternative regional projects with different membership, still concentrating around Russia 
(like the Eurasian Economic Community) were equally unsuccessful (cf. Libman, 2007). 
 On the other hand, at least three leading post-Soviet countries experienced a strong 
trend towards decentralization. Once again, de-jure almost all CIS countries created unitary 
constitutions allowing for very limited autonomy of regional administrations. Ukraine turned 
into a federacy granting special privileges to Crimea Republic, and Russia officially was 
declared a federation; however, after the initial legislation on intergovernmental relations and 
the constitution were passed in 1993-1994, it also turned into a relatively centralized federal 
structure with limited authorities of regions (for example, the federal government still 
controlled the decision-making for a wide range of legal issues, as well as had exclusive 
authority over taxation; federal prerogatives in the regions were implemented by the federal 
agencies and not delegated to regional governors, as it happens to be the case in many other 
centralized federations like Germany or Austria). On the other hand, however, it is well-
known that during this period the post-Soviet countries experienced significant de-facto 
devolution, when regional governments were able to “seize” substantial autonomy. 
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 Probably, the best studied case of this de-facto devolution and its mechanisms is the 
Russian Federation. Regional governments obtained additional authorities through a system 
of post-constitutional bilateral and multilateral treaties with the federal administration, 
granting exclusive privileges to individual regions (Obydenkova, 2008), implementation of 
acts directly violating the federal law (Libman, 2009), capture of local agencies of the federal 
government (for example, in law enforcement and taxation) and courts, which can then be 
used to manipulate the implementation of federal law in favor of the federal government 
(Enikolopov et al., 2002, XXX). However, similar trends using almost identical mechanisms 
have been reported throughout the whole period of the 1990s in Kazakhstan (Jones Luong, 
2004). In both countries this informal devolution did influence different regions unequally 
and resulted in strong asymmetries in terms of de-facto authorities accepted by the regional 
governors. In Ukraine in the early 1990s the decentralization was compatible to that in Russia 
and Kazakhstan, however, already in the mid-1990s manipulations of the central government 
allowed it to reduce the de-facto autonomy of regions, thus preceding the same trend to re-
centralization observed in other two largest post-Soviet countries in the 2000s (Turovskiy, 
1999). Nevertheless, Ukraine also experienced problems of “capture” of central agencies by 
the regional administration (Way, 2002). In addition, in all three countries regional 
governments became strong actors in the central political decision-making.  
 
3.2. Weak regionalism, weak decentralization: Russia and the CIS in the 2000s 
 In the early 2000s the situation in the post-Soviet world partly changed, but only with 
respect to the domestic decentralization. On the one hand, the degree of centralization within 
individual countries increased dramatically. The change is probably best documented for 
Russia and Kazakhstan, where the development has also been relatively straightforward. One 
of the first steps of the administration of Vladimir Putin in 2000 was to implement a series of 
measures restricting the autonomy of regions both through formal institutional reforms, but 
also through informal changes e.g. in appointment policies for heads of regional branches of 
federal agencies. Simultaneously the federal government initiated the process of re-evaluating 
the regional law in order to ensure its conformity to the federal legislation. In a way, speed 
and success of Putin’s recentralization reforms has been surprising for the observers (Ross, 
2003; Kahn et al., 2009); although Putin did not start the re-centralization (some elements of 
this policy could be observed during the late Yeltsin period), but he was able to implement it 
quickly and relatively successfully. In Kazakhstan the shift from decentralized system to the 
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centralization has been less clear, also partly because there were no personal changes involved 
(Nursultan Nazarbaev remained president of the country), however, was also linked to severe 
measures like re-drawing regional borders and re-appointments of governors (Jones Luong, 
2004). In other countries like Ukraine the described trend towards centralization was less 
pronounced. 
 However, for the purpose of this paper the most important result of the shifts described 
is that one obtained a certain discrepancy between the domestic and the international multi-
level governance developments. While within Russia the federal government has been 
extremely successful in gaining control over regional administrations, its attempts to force a 
stronger cooperation between post-Soviet countries – either through new institutions of 
cooperation like the Single Economic Space initiated by Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and 
Belarus in mid-2000s or reforms of the Eurasian Economic Community, or through direct 
interventions in the political decision-making in the post-Soviet world, have been almost 
always unsuccessful. Although Russian foreign policy attention to the CIS increased 
significantly (cf. Trenin, 2009:87-88), the only visible outcome of this process have been 
stronger tensions between Russia and its neighbors (particularly Ukraine and Georgia, but 
also with Belarus, which has been one of the strongest proponents of the integration before) 
(cf. Libman, 2009a). Hence, the weakness of the regionalism in the CIS persisted in the 2000s 
(also probably supporting the continuing economic disintegration of the post-Soviet space, see 
Libman and Vinokurov, 2010), while within individual countries the trend towards re-
centralization dominated.  
 
3.3. Strong regionalism, weak decentralization: Russian regions and municipalities in 
the 2000s 
 As already discussed in the previous part of the paper, by using the terms 
“international” and “internal” I simply refer to two levels of the organization of political 
systems. Therefore the example for strong regionalism and weak decentralization will use two 
decentralization processes just within one country: devolution of individual regions in their 
bargaining with the federal administration and devolution within individual regions in the 
relations with municipalities. I will for this purpose consider the process of region-
municipalities relations in the Russian Federation in the 2000s. Like the center-region 
relations in the 1990s, where different regions were able to obtain different level of autonomy, 
region-municipality relations have also been highly complex. The municipal reform in Russia, 
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which started almost simultaneously with the development of the formal framework for the 
federation, has been notoriously contradictory and inconclusive: hence, while in some regions 
municipalities were strongly controlled by the regional administration, in others they were 
able to gain significant autonomy.  
Nevertheless, typical trend for many regions in Russia in the second half of the 1990s 
became the conflict between the governors of the regions and the heads of influential 
municipalities (usually mayors of the largest cities) (see Turovskiy, 2003). The mayors 
usually received their mandate through a public election (as the governors did), and hence did 
not directly depend on the regional administration. The conflicts took significantly different 
forms ranging from highly institutionalized opposition (associated with party-building and 
changes in regional and municipal constitutions) to personalized conflict between two 
powerful politicians) and involved different degrees of collective action between 
municipalities within a region (Barabanov, 1999). However, in the first half of the 2000s 
these conflicts seem to become weaker, mostly because the governors succeeded in their 
confrontation and restricted the power of the mayors.  
It is however worth noticing that the success of governors in the internal centralization 
of their regions and their “weakness” in relations with the federal government seem to be 
somehow correlated. Figure 2 represents the relation between the retention rate (share of the 
overall tax collection from the region al territory attributed to the consolidated (region and 
municipalities) regional budget) and the share of the regional administration in the overall tax 
revenue of the consolidated regional budget. One can see that these two values exhibit a 
negative correlation, which is also statistically significant: hence, if the region exhibited high 
retention rate (decentralization from the federal government), it also typically had high share 
of municipalities in the consolidated budget’s tax revenue. It is certainly the case that these 
fiscal indicators can be treated only as imperfect proxies for decentralization of authorities; 
however, the observation is worth noticing. 
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Figure 2: Decentralization within regions and in the center-region relations in Russia, 2003 
 
In the mid-2000s the government of Putin, which has previously been successful in re-
centralization on the regional level, also increased its interventions on the municipal level. 
The 2003 local self-governance act established a very well-defined framework for 
municipalities, which has to be implemented all over the Russian Federation and has been 
actively used by governors to restrict the autonomy of strong municipalities and also partially 
eliminate the direct elections of mayors (the act introduced the city-manager analogue in 
Russia, when the head of municipalities is employed through a contract with the city council), 
making the new appointees dependent on the regional administration (Gel’man, 2007). In a 
similar way, while in the 1990s the federal government partly supported the mayors hoping to 
create a countervailing power to the governors, in the 2000s the governors were put under 
control of the federal center, and hence, there was no need in an independent “municipal” pole 
of power – on the contrary, its direct subordination to the governors became desirable 
(Makarkin, 2007). 
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3.4. Strong regionalism, strong decentralization: cross-border cooperation in the 1990s 
 Probably the most difficult case to find in the post-Soviet space is that of strong 
regionalism combined with strong decentralization (as it has been described before, this is 
exactly the scenario considered standard by the existing literature). However, under certain 
conditions, one could look at the skyrocketing cross-border regional cooperation of the 1990s 
as an example of this setting. As already mentioned, in the 1990s the intergovernmental 
cooperation in the post-Soviet space remained extremely weak. However, at the same time the 
period was marked by the emergence of strong paradiplomatic activities of Russian regions, 
which became active and often independent actors of international relations at least within the 
CIS region. Although according to the Russian federal constitutions regional administrations 
were not allowed to sign independent international treaties and had to implement their 
external economic relations though a coordinated framework set up by the central 
government, seventy-six of eighty-eight regional constitutions declared the region’s right to 
engage in international and external economic relations: of forty-two major power-sharing 
treaties only two did not extend the authorities of the regions on the international arena. While 
the paradiplomacy of Russian region was not limited to the post-Soviet space 
(Sharafutdinova, 2003), it has certainly had a strong impact on the CIS in particular. 
 International cooperation between the regions of Russia and of other post-Soviet states 
(as well as partially these states themselves, if that was the relevant level for external 
economic policy decisions) has started in one form or another almost instantaneously after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. However, unlike the “high-level” regionalism, which focused on 
broad agreements with ambitious goals, the contacts between regions usually had extremely 
strong connections to the business interests of particular companies looking for partners in 
other CIS states or attempting to re-establish the old Soviet economic ties. In several cases 
(like for the City of Moscow) the relations were also connected with the supposed business 
interests of the governors themselves. The activities of Russian regions increased significantly 
after the economic crisis of 1997, when the protectionism in the cross-border trade became 
more important and therefore the support of regional administrations became crucial. It is 
usually claimed that Russian regions were the “proactive” agent in the cooperation, starting 
the negotiations with regions in other post-Soviet countries, while the active position seems to 
correlate with a significantly higher level of devolution achieved by the Russian regions in the 
foreign policy matters: even in Ukraine and Kazakhstan the ability of regional governments to 
engage in paradiplomatic activity or even purely economic cooperation was lower (cf. 
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Nemyria, 1999, Guliev, 2009). In many cases this cross-border cooperation was 
institutionalized through agreements and even intergovernmental organization (like border 
region councils) (cf. Zabello and Sobyanin, 2001; Schneider, 2002; Golunov, 2005). 
Therefore the interaction between regions was in many cases not influenced by the general 
political conflicts on the high level and thus was more successful (Makarychev, 2000).2  
 The increasing re-centralization in the 2000s formally did not put an end to this cross-
border cooperation. On the contrary, officially the sub-regional cooperation was still endorsed 
and supported by the federal government. However, the federal administration specifically 
restricted the autonomy of regions in the international relations, putting any form of cross-
border cooperation under strict control of the federal government. Therefore it is not 
surprising that the observers reported increasing difficulties in the area of cooperation 
between regions (Vardomsky, 2003, 2006) or at least increasing transaction costs through the 
“coordination” by the central government (Alexeev, 2000), which simply turned into part of 
the overall government-led regionalism strategy for the Russian involvement in the CIS – 
which, as noticed above, has been completely unsuccessful. Let me provide one particular 
example how centralization influenced the cross-border cooperation. In order to facilitate the 
cross-border cooperation, territorial specialization of the customs is required: in this case the 
imported and exported goods can be processed in a particular region without delays. On the 
contrary, the federal government in the 2000s actively promoted the functional organisation 
of the customs: in this case the customs clearing for individual types of exported goods was 
possible only in a limited number of branches in Russia, often located in a different region 
then the location of the actual transaction. Even more, the regional administrations lost their 
ability to influence the customs (even informally) in order to promote the cross-border 
cooperation (Vardomsky 2009a).  
 
4. Distribution and efficiency: co-evolution of regionalism and decentralization 
As I have shown so far, one indeed can observe different combinations of internal and 
international developments in multi-level governance: the main goal of the paper is however 
to provide explanations for these differences. For this purpose we will attempt to distinguish 
among the redistribution conflict and the efficiency trade-off in each of the cases and thus to 
clarify how these two features influenced each other, generating the results observed. Each 
                                                            
2
 It should be noted though that decentralization does not necessarily act as a tool offering regional governments 
the opportunity to embrace the international cooperation. It is possible that the regional governments are more 
protectionist to support their domestic enterprises, while the central government destroys these monopolies – 
then centralization and integration could go hand in hand.  
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conflict is characterized primarily by the power asymmetry, and each efficiency trade-off by 
the relation between efficiency gains from cooperation and political risks. 
 
4.1. Weak regionalism, strong decentralization 
Let me consider first the case of leading FSU countries in the 1990s: when weak post-
Soviet integration was combined with weak centralization. If one looks at both redistribution 
conflicts within and between individual countries, the results are relatively straightforward: 
the decentralization within countries was caused by relative weakness of the central authority 
vis-à-vis regional administrations. In Russia during the late 1980s - early 1990s subgroups of 
regions (like the so-called autonomous republics) successfully used the contradictions first 
between the Soviet and the Russian republican administrations, and then between the 
Supreme Council and the president (Sheinis, 2005) in order to obtain strong gains represented 
by the Federal Treaty – the predecessor of the Russian constitution. Later on this multilateral 
bargaining situation was replaced by bilateral bargaining, where particular regions once again 
forced the federation to provide stronger devolution in exchange for loyalty and electoral 
support and also in absence of effective tools of control – although one should mention that 
this power potential was accumulated just by a small group of regions with others being not 
particularly eager to support devolution (Crosston, 2004). Situation in other CIS countries was 
somewhat similar.  
From the point of view of the conflict between the CIS countries, the key element is, 
unlike the domestic “vertical” conflicts, the “horizontal” conflict, where the key problem can 
be attributed to the power relations between the Russian Federation and other countries. 
Russia is obviously the strongest member of the CIS, and thus could theoretically be 
perceived as an integration leader in the Mattli’s (1999) sense. Nevertheless, during the 1990s 
Russia seems to combine two features preventing regional integration from being successful: 
on the one hand, it has been strong enough to be perceived as a threat by other countries 
(D’Anieri, 1997), but on the other hand obviously weak enough to really influence the 
domestic decisions (Libman, 2007). Other countries of the CIS (like Kazakhstan), which 
seemed to pursue its own integration agenda, have been significantly weaker during this 
period and obviously unable to support regionalism, although the situation seems to have 
changed slightly in the 1990s (Libman and Vinokurov, 2010a). 
Now consider the complementary efficiency trade-off. For the domestic efficiency 
trade-off the situation is simple: re-centralizing the governments were able to obtain support 
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for their international political initiatives, but potentially had to suffer under significant 
political costs through adjusting to regional preferences in international relations. For all three 
largest CIS countries one can observe at least certain differences between central and regional 
perceptions of foreign policy. In Ukraine and Kazakhstan the key issue was the support of re-
integration with Russia by the Russian-speaking territories in the East and the North 
respectively; for Russia the effect was smaller but, for example, was present in the Northern 
Caucasus, where ethnic republics were actively involved in the conflicts in Georgia and 
Azerbaijan. Hence, adaptation to regional preferences was relatively costly, especially for 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan, were it could in fact challenge the nation-building project; therefore 
in this particular case political risks seem to be higher than potential benefits in terms of 
power potential. 
For the international efficiency trade-off, probably, both risks and gains were rather 
small. There is almost no evidence of direct support of devolutionist and separatist interests 
by the neighboring CIS countries. The reasons are relatively straightforward: the CIS 
countries, as many non- and semi-democratic regimes in emerging nations with weak and 
disputable borders, seem to be able to achieve consensus in terms of “not supporting” 
secessionism because of huge external effects of these policies for the own territorial 
integrity. For example, for Russia officially encouraging separatism and devolution in 
Ukraine or Georgia would symmetrically create problems in the Northern Caucasus (for 
Central Asia see this discussion in Libman, 2009b). Therefore this absolute minimum of 
cooperation needed to prevent the direct support of internal devolution interests seems to have 
been present anyway and no further cooperation was required. In fact, this fact can indeed 
explain the reasons for individual governments to claim to support cooperation without real 
actions: for example, in Kazakhstan declarations of integration support (like the project of the 
Eurasian Union in the early 1990s) without any real implementation was a very cheap way to 
reduce problems with domestic Russian minorities and thus strengthen the internal political 
position of the regime (Pomfret, 2009).3 Therefore complementarities between the domestic 
power conflict and international efficiency trade-off could probably be one of the reasons for 
persistence of regional cooperation projects without any implementation. 
To conclude, the efficiency trade-offs seem to support the results obtained in power 
conflicts. On the other hand, the allocation of power also seems to be relevant for at least one 
                                                            
3
 In this case actually no clear border between international and domestic policy decisions exists: enhancing the 
role of Russian language, for example, pleases simultaneously the Russian Federation and the Russian 
minorities. 
20 
 
of the efficiency trade-offs (for the domestic re-centralization). Thus, in addition there seems 
to be an indirect link between the domestic and the international power conflicts through the 
shape of the efficiency trade-off for the domestic decentralization.  
 
4.2. Weak regionalism, weak decentralization 
 The results of bargaining in the 2000s seem, once again, to depend first on the power 
allocation for both conflicts. Within Russia the changed federal administration and new active 
president seem to shift the balance of power towards the central government from the 
coalition of regions, where the strongest territories received almost no support from the 
majority of regional administrations interested primarily in federal transfers (Gel’man, 2006). 
In Kazakhstan even no shift in administration was necessary: it sufficed that the central 
government accumulated substantial resources from the economic growth in the country, 
which allowed it to re-define power relations with the regions. On the other hand, the 
autonomy obtained by Russian and Kazakhstani regions in the 1990s was mostly based on 
informal relations, which could be easily re-defined given new power constellation and new 
personalities; in the international relations a more significant shift of power was necessary, 
since the national governments of the CIS had the full formal power over their territories 
supported by their recognition by the international community: and this final shift did not 
seem to happen. Thus, Russian central government succeeded in re-centralization within, but 
still faced the same problem of the “weak power asymmetry” abroad (Libman, 2009a). For 
Kazakhstan the situation was even more pronounced, because its power resources became 
somewhat sufficient to support regionalism only in the late 2000s and only for a limited scope 
of countries (specifically, Kyrgyz Republic) – and therefore simply did not have enough time 
to realize its full potential before the economic crisis of the 2008-2009, which hit the 
economy of this country very hard (Vardomsky, 2009; Golovnin et al., 2010). 
 The efficiency trade-offs, once again, seem to support the outcomes of power 
conflicts. In the international relations cooperation was still associated with significant 
political risks and low gains – in fact, the gains even went down because of the consolidation 
of political regimes, which were less interested in foreign support any more, while the risks 
remained equally high. The stronger the internal re-centralization is, the less interested are 
countries in cross-border cooperation (because the support from strong foreign power sources 
is not needed any more – neither as source of internal stability nor from the point of view of 
the secession threat of individual regions, which played a strong role in the international 
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policy considerations in the 1990s, as it has been discussed above). This is in fact present 
even for weaker CIS countries like Tajikistan: while in the 1990s it experienced the extreme 
form of devolution in form of a civil war, which in fact could be described as “war between 
regions”, in the 2000s its regime re-consolidated its power through explicit Russian support 
(although even now the control over several regional administrations is reported to be 
questionable) and started perceiving Russian presence as a burden: for example, while in the 
late 1990s Russian investors received preferential treatment in Tajikistan, in the late 2000s the 
Tajikistani government forced them to abandon the most attractive projects, like the 
reconstruction of the Rogun Hydroelectric Power Plant (Libman, 2009b). One should also 
remember that the domestic re-centralization also made stronger countries even stronger, 
therefore increasing political risks for the weaker countries. 
 As for the domestic efficiency trade-off, here the political risks went down (through 
the changing power structure, which made the concessions to regional governments not 
necessary any more), hence, creating a situation where gains were higher than risks (the gains 
were associated, say, with stronger bargaining position abroad because of lower secessionist 
threat). In fact, Russian re-centralization in the 1990s was probably the main reason why 
Russia was able to engage in the five-days-war with Georgia over its separatist regions 
Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia in 2008 without creating extreme threats for its own integrity 
in the Northern Caucasus (although still establishing some problems in the relations with the 
autonomous republics, see Silaev, 2009). On the other hand, the full use of international 
power resources can be at least one of the reasons for still maintaining the de-jure federal 
structure (Zakharov, 2008), which – at least potentially – made the incorporation of new 
territorial units possible. 
  
4.3. Strong regionalism, weak decentralization 
 The case of the strong regionalism and strong centralization, which, as mentioned, was 
observed in the region-municipalities relations in the 2000s, is probably particularly 
illustrative from the point of view of linkages between both conflicts and both efficiency 
trade-offs. If one looks at both power conflicts, one can find, on the one hand, relatively weak 
regions, losing their power position under the new administration of Vladimir Putin, but on 
the other hand, also weakening municipalities (particularly, regional capitals) as outcome of 
the power struggles of the late 1990s, which were mostly resolved in the favor of the 
governors.  
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In terms of efficiency trade-offs, the situation is more interesting. Consider first the 
“international” efficiency trade-off (in this case it refers to the trade-off for the re-
centralization in the relations between the federal government and the regions). In this case 
for both the central and the regional governments the cooperation in order to reduce autonomy 
of municipalities seemed to be an attractive solution without strong political risks because of 
aligned interests – both center and regions were willing to re-construct a strong hierarchy 
(denoted in the Russian discourse as “vertical of power”). As mentioned, while in the 1990s 
strong regions made the central government to support strong municipalities as a 
countervailing force, in the 2000s this approach was no longer required – and weak 
municipalities became attractive in terms of stronger control over all aspects of political 
decisions. Even more, supporting re-centralization in individual regions was a good way to 
ensure greater loyalty of regional administrations to the federal recentralization reform, which 
therefore partly solved their own “domestic” problems for them. 
The “domestic” trade-off (within regions) seems to be less important in this case: 
regional administrations had to suffer under small political risks, but also were unable to 
obtain significant gains, because the municipal administrations have already been weakened 
in the 1990s and were not used by the federal administration as allies in the conflict any more. 
Once again, however, one can see the multitude of links: first, domestic power conflict of the 
1990s influences the domestic efficiency trade-off in the 2000s (rendering it not important for 
the re-centralization debate); on the other hand, international efficiency trade-off influences 
the international and the domestic re-centralization (providing both parties with necessary 
power resources), and at the same time depends on the outcomes of the international power 
conflict (which made the search for allies on municipal level irrelevant for the federal 
government). 
 
4.4. Strong regionalism, strong decentralization 
In the final case study one has to focus just on one conflict and complementary 
efficiency trade-off. There seems to be no evidence of contradictions of different regions of 
the post-Soviet countries in international politics, and at least they have been significantly less 
important than the vertical conflict between the regions and the central governments in mostly 
de-jure centralized post-Soviet states. Hence, I will focus on the last conflict, which, as 
already mentioned, has been characterized by the relative weakness of the central 
government. The complementary efficiency trade-off in the international relations seems once 
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again to re-enforce the results of the power conflict – and, on the other hand, the power 
conflict seems to re-enforce the outcomes of the efficiency trade-off.  
Indeed, on the one hand, engaging in international cross-border cooperation served as 
a tool strengthening internal bargaining position of regions. There seems in fact to be 
evidence that regions used paradiplomacy to obtain additional “symbolic capital” in 
bargaining and applied cross-border cooperation for competition between regions within 
Russia. In addition, as mentioned, cross-border cooperation played a positive role in terms of 
economic recovery of regions, therefore also providing them with an additional source of 
power. In some regions (like the City of Moscow) cooperation with the CIS countries was 
also used to strengthen the electoral position of the governors, receiving support of its own 
population (for example, this motive could have been important for Moscow’s position 
towards Crimea). Given that the political costs of cross-border cooperation were very small 
(once again, because of the absent power asymmetries influencing the cooperation between 
countries in the CIS, but also because of clear economic focus), the efficiency trade-off 
supported cross-border cooperation.  
On the other hand, the results of domestic power conflict provided regions with the 
sufficient power position and autonomy to engage in any form of independent international 
economic relations – partly even ignoring the goals of the Russian foreign politics. 
Table 1 summarizes the results of the analysis of four post-Soviet cases once again. 
 
Table 1: Four cases of decentralization and regional integration: explanatory factors 
Case Domestic 
decentralization 
International 
regionalism 
Domestic International 
Redistribution Efficiency Redistribution Efficiency 
CIS in the 
1990s 
Strong Weak Weak central 
government, 
strong (group 
of) regions 
Political 
risks 
higher 
than gains 
Russia too 
strong to be 
perceived as 
threat but too 
weak to really 
influence 
Both gains 
and political 
risks small, 
but seems to 
explain 
pseudo- 
cooperation 
CIS in the 
2000s 
Weak Weak Weak regions, 
increasing 
strengths of the 
center 
Risks go 
down with 
gains 
increasing 
Russia too 
strong to be 
perceived as 
threat but too 
weak to really 
influence 
Risks 
increase 
with gains 
going down 
Regions and 
municipalities 
in Russia in the 
2000s 
Weak Strong Weak 
municipalities 
(results of the 
1990s) 
Neither 
risks nor 
gains are 
significant 
because of 
the power 
conflict 
Weak regions, 
increasing 
strengths of the 
center 
No political 
risks due to 
identical 
interests and 
significant 
gains 
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outcomes 
in the 
1990s 
Cross-border 
cooperation in 
the 1990s 
Strong Strong Weak central 
government, 
strong (group 
of) regions 
  Limited 
political 
costs, 
significant, 
gains 
 
5. Conclusion 
 This paper aimed to examine the problem of interaction between two aspects of the 
multi-level governance initiatives: domestic decentralization and international integration – 
which remained relatively unexplored in the literature. For this purpose it developed a simple 
framework combining the analysis of distributional conflicts and efficiency trade-offs for two 
complementary processes within and between countries. Then it looked at the devolution and 
regionalism in one particular region of the world – the post-Soviet countries – and 
demonstrated that in this group different combinations of domestic and international 
processes were observed under, generally speaking, not so different external political and 
economic environment – and thus provided a suitable background to applying and testing the 
developed framework. 
 Strong and successful domestic decentralization was combined with an extremely 
weak international integration in the three largest countries of the CIS in the 1990s. During 
this period, on the one hand, both power conflicts were characterized by extreme power 
asymmetries: on the one hand, weakness of the central authority versus regions, and on the 
other hand, combination of “too strong to cause fear” and “too weak to interfere” for Russia 
in the international relations – thus, given different nature of these two “vertical” and 
“horizontal” conflicts partly explaining the results observed. For the international conflict the  
respective domestic efficiency trade-off was associated with significantly higher political 
risks than gains given strong foreign policy preferences of regions partly contradicting the 
nation-building project; for the domestic conflict the international trade-off, probably, did not 
provide strong gains and costs whatsoever given the caution of post-Soviet regimes with 
respect to support devolution and secessions in their neighboring states – however, this trade-
off is likely to explain the observed persistence of formal pseudo-cooperation, when regional 
governments signed treaties without implementing them. 
 The case of weak regionalism and weak centralization was observed on the same level 
of international and domestic relations in the 2000s, when, on the one hand, all countries 
somewhat successfully re-centralized within, but the regionalism and the cross-border 
25 
 
cooperation remained very weak. Here one finds, once again, clear evidence that the 
development of the power potential of all bargaining parties supported the evolution 
described: stronger central government vis-à-vis regions and still absent sufficient power 
potential of Russia (and partly Kazakhstan) in international relations. The domestic efficiency 
trade-off showed that gains were much higher than risks (thus supporting domestic re-
centralization as a tool to “untie one’s hands” in the international relations), and the 
international efficiency trade-off slowly reduced the gains, making risks more prevalent 
(given stronger position of central regimes in the CIS countries against separatists, 
autonomists and any other form of opposition the support from abroad was not needed any 
more). Therefore, once again, efficiency trade-offs enforced the power conflicts. 
 In order to find a case for strong regionalism and weak decentralization I had to look 
“one level deeper” in the jurisdictional architecture – the probably most reasonable case for 
comparison in this framework is the re-centralization in the region-municipal relations in the 
Russian Federation in the 1990s. Here the results, once again, are related first to the outcomes 
of two power conflicts, were stronger center enforced re-centralization from weaker regions, 
and stronger regions supported re-centralization from weaker municipalities. However, the 
“international” efficiency trade-off (which in this case refers to the relations between the 
federal and the regional governments) seems to have enforced re-centralization on the region-
municipality level, because there seems to be little political risk (in the particular power 
constellation neither the federal government nor the regions were interested in strong 
municipalities – and political risks require differences in preferences between bargaining 
parties) and offered some gains (for example, kind of a “reward” for regions for being 
supportive to federal re-centralization). The “domestic” efficiency trade-off (within regions) 
does not seem to provide neither costs nor gains for both parties given the weakness of 
municipal governments as outcome of the power struggles at this level in the 1990s. 
 The combination of successful decentralization and somewhat successful regionalism 
could be once again observed in the 1990s, but on the other level: the flourishing cross-border 
cooperation and paradiplomacy of Russian regions was combined with decentralization within 
Russia. In this case just one power conflict (internal) and hence one efficiency trade-off 
(international) is relevant, and one can clearly show how both processes reinforced each 
other: cross-border cooperation provided power resources for the domestic conflict, and the 
power allocation through the domestic conflict provided the autonomy for engaging in the 
cross-border cooperation. 
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 It remains to conclude that in all cases there indeed exists a link between the domestic 
and the international multi-level governance. Specifically, two types of links were observed: 
on the one hand, the results of the power conflicts often influenced the political risks and the 
potential gains in the efficiency trade-offs; and on the other hand, efficiency trade-offs had a 
clear impact on the power potential in the distribution conflicts. Anyway, however, no unique 
combination of the multi-level governance structures within individual countries and across 
their borders was observed: and therefore decentralization and regionalism can form different 
stable combinations of institutions.  
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